From privacy to transparency

 

The right to privacy is essentially the freedom from intrusion by others in an individual’s personal life or affairs.^[1] Privacy is protected by law and is a basic, but not absolute, human right. Privacy obligations also arise in, and can be varied by, contracts and other commercial and professional relationships. Total privacy does not exist, as various laws (correctly) override the right.

Over the years, privacy rights have been abused by tax evaders and criminals. This mischief has arguably contributed to a proliferation in offshore wealth structuring, as high-net-worth individuals and multinational corporations set up bank accounts, companies and trusts in offshore jurisdictions.

However, a global paradigm shift is now occurring as data about our everyday lives is increasingly available and valuable, meaning our privacy is not as protected as it once was. Some of this availability is volunteered by individuals who willingly share photos, information and other data on digital platforms. However, much of this availability is involuntary, as financial institutions (FIs) and professionals are compelled to gather and disclose customer data to the regulatory, law enforcement and government agencies that are cracking down on money laundering and tax evasion.

New and rapidly evolving compliance regimes represent significant changes to the ordinary course of business for FIs and professional firms. The various compliance regimes have many similarities and generally require businesses to gather much more information before accepting client engagements.

These compliance regimes also impose obligations on businesses and other third parties to disclose information to law enforcement and government agencies in certain circumstances. This is a paradigm shift from the traditional ‘trusted advisor’ role for many FIs and professional firms. It also means an increased cost of doing business, both for the service provider and the customer.

There are all manner of human rights issues that arise from this approach to law and tax enforcement, from risks to open access to justice to existential threats to the very foundations of democracy. These developments bring new threats to privacy and present challenges to regulators in protecting individual privacy and data protection rights. However, the reality is that these compliance regimes have been implemented and are here to stay and now FIs and professionals must meet the challenge of compliance.

What this wholesale erosion of privacy means for our society as a whole remains to be seen. This article intends to offer some recent historical context and weave together the various strands to provide an overview of the current compliance landscape and offer some thoughts as to what might happen next.

Privacy is a fundamental human right (with exceptions)

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines individuals’ right to privacy. This is reflected in domestic legislation in many countries and international instruments (such as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)), as well as the law of equity (such as the equitable duty of confidentiality).

However, there are two main areas in which the right to privacy is overridden. These are as follows.

Tax evasion

This is the illegal failure to pay taxes. It involves deliberate misrepresentation to tax authorities of the true value of capital and/or income. By not declaring certain income, gains, profits or capital assets or by overstating deductions, a person (whether an individual or entity, such as a company) may reduce their tax liability. Tax evasion has historically been distinguished from tax avoidance, which is the legal structuring of affairs and use of tax laws to reduce liability to pay tax.

Money laundering

This is the process by which criminals attempt to conceal the true origin of the proceeds of their criminal activities to make it appear as if they were obtained legitimately. This involves placing the proceeds of crime into the financial system, creating complex layers of financial transactions to disguise the origins of the funds and then integrating the laundered funds into the legitimate economy. Money laundering is the lifeblood of a professional criminal enterprise because it can be used to advance other criminal objectives while reducing the risk of prosecution. The scale of money laundering ranges from crimes like tax evasion through to financing acts of terror.

More recently, geopolitical events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have resulted in the imposition of sanctions, which also involve a loss of privacy and a restriction on business and other dealings to influence the behaviour of foreign governments and individuals. A difference with sanctions is that they are targeted.

The extent to which the right to privacy has been overridden in these areas has accelerated in recent years, raising important legal and ethical questions about the increasing mass collection of taxpayer data and its disclosure.

How are governments responding to these crimes?

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11) resulted in a new focus on the financing of terrorism because it was clear that the terrorists were well funded and supported by the global financial system. Accordingly, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF’s) remit was expanded to assist in fighting terrorist financing. Terrorist financing refers to activities that provide capital to fuel individual terrorists or terrorist groups.

Terrorist financing involves similar processes to money laundering. Other developments introduced by governments to fight these crimes include:

AML/CFT legislation and regulations

Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) legislation criminalises money laundering by making it an offence for a person to place the proceeds of their crime into the global financial system. More significantly, it also makes it a criminal offence for an FI to allow this to happen, so imposing requirements on FIs to verify the identity of customers and the legitimacy of funds held in accounts. Money laundering has a material effect on developing countries in particular because, as capital is diverted from their economies, development is inhibited through the perpetuation of poverty. In some cases, a small group of oligarchs entrench themselves in positions of power, authority and prosperity, financed by the proceeds of crime. AML/CFT laws and regulations are aimed at detecting and preventing this type of activity.

Automatic exchange of information

In recent years, governments have joined in the global fight against tax evasion. The US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) are the latest manifestations of their efforts. FATCA and the CRS represent a generational shift in the way in which personal financial information is gathered, held and exchanged between FIs and governments. FATCA and the CRS shift the burden of compliance away from taxpayers (after all, tax evaders could never be relied upon to report honestly) and instead impose that burden on the FIs (e.g., banks and trust companies) who serve them. If those FIs do not comply, then competent authorities and regulators can apply withholding taxes and other penalties.

4AMLD

There has been a push towards collecting extensive information around beneficial ownership (BO). In many offshore jurisdictions there are, and have been for some time, requirements for trust and corporate services providers to collect BO information. However, the new trend is focused on establishing centralised, national databases of BO information. The EU Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4AMLD),^[2] which entered into force in June 2017, was the first practical measure implemented to achieve this goal. It requires EU Member States to implement central BO registers (referred to later in this article) for trusts and trust-like entities. 4AMLD is primarily focused on tax concerns rather than AML/CFT.

5AMLD

The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (5AMLD)^[3] came into force in each Member State by 10 January 2020. 5AMLD is essentially an extension of 4AMLD. The initial draft of 5AMLD provided for unfettered public access to the BO registers of trusts maintained by each Member State, which would remove the requirement to prove legitimate interest. In addition, the initial draft proposed to extend BO reporting to all trusts created, administered or operated in the EU, and not only those that have a tax consequence in a Member State. The version of 5AMLD that was ultimately adopted removed unfettered public access in relation to trusts and reintroduced the access rights for persons holding a ‘legitimate interest’. However, 5AMLD also included a requirement for public access to BO registers relating to companies, with no requirement to prove a ‘legitimate interest’.

Beneficial ownership registers

A BO register is a centralised register that records the individuals who ultimately own or control a particular entity or asset. BO registers are intended to increase the transparency of the ownership of entities and assets, in part to help prevent or investigate money laundering or other crimes. Due to the level of information that can potentially be included in BO registers, the accessibility of the information is a material issue. At this stage, jurisdictions with functioning BO registers generally restrict access to specific classes of people, such as law enforcement or tax agencies. Some jurisdictions have implemented the standard outlined in 4AMLD/5AMLD of allowing access to individuals or groups that can evidence a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information. This class is generally considered to include journalists.

EU mandatory disclosure rule

The EU Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation, which repeals Directive 77/799/EEC (known as DAC6), was created as a practical measure to strengthen tax transparency in the EU. DAC6 applies to any transaction between jurisdictions if at least one of them is an EU Member State and the transaction qualifies as an ‘aggressive tax planning position’. All jurisdictions in the EU were required to pass DAC6 into domestic law by 1 July 2020. The DAC6 amendment to include mandatory disclosure requirements (MDRs) was implemented in 2018 as a mechanism to aid tax authorities in the identification of potential money laundering or tax evasion practices and prevent non-compliance with the CRS. The measure requires anybody involved in an attempt to evade the CRS to disclose this to their local government.

Concerns with government responses

Many have raised concerns in relation to the privacy and data protection consequences of 4/5AMLD and other information disclosure regimes. Governments (and potentially others) now have unprecedented access to a significant volume of information about their citizens. In addition to the incursions into privacy that these measures represent, there are risks of identity fraud or to the physical safety of individuals if information is accessed by unauthorised users. The EU’s own data protection regulator issued an opinion in 2017 criticising 5AMLD’s introduction of public access elements. The opinion stated that this feature would infringe the privacy right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Other privacy and data protection concerns and issues that have arisen include the following.

Legality

Article 8 of the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provide that ‘interference with an individual’s right to privacy and data protection must be in accordance with the law’. This principle requires that not only must there be a specific law that permits the interference in question but also that it must be reasonably foreseeable and accessible to enable the individual to address their conduct before the interference occurs.

Proportionality

Proportionality is a bedrock principle of the EU legal system. This means that an action of the EU must be limited to what is necessary to ensure the functioning of the EU. In other words, are central registers proportionate or necessary in the fight against tax evasion and financial crime? Should ordinary businesses that have no connection to tax evasion or money laundering be forced to disclose information to the public about their business structure?^[4] Arguably, the existing tools at the EU’s disposal mean these measures are disproportionate, and it raises the question of what exactly the data is being collected for if existing automatic exchange of information and AML/CFT regulations are sufficient.

GDPR

The GDPR represents the most significant development in European privacy and data protection law in many years. The GDPR sets out a number of data protection principles that apply across the EU, including requirements to minimise the collection of data from individuals and to ensure that data is kept secure. Several aspects of the GDPR appear to be in plain conflict with 4/5AMLD, and the GDPR does not exclude public bodies from its scope. This particular aspect is the subject of litigation in the English and Welsh courts.

Re Helen S decision^[5]

Interestingly, the French government pre-empted the EU by introducing its own public register of trusts in 2016. The French Constitutional Council (the French Court) promptly struck the register down in the case of Re Helen S. In this case, an elderly woman challenged the legality of the register on the basis it would infringe her privacy and would require public disclosure of the bequests left in her will. The French Court held that the public registry of trusts infringed the right to privacy in a disproportionate manner compared to the aim of fighting against tax fraud and evasion. The French Court declared the register illegal in its entirety.

The use of transparency regimes for public relations purposes

Former UK politician Nigel Farage made headlines in June 2023 when he disclosed that private bank Coutts (part of the NatWest Group) intended to close his bank accounts.^[6] Coutts publicly stated that the bank intended to do so as the funds Farage held in the bank accounts did not meet minimum prescribed thresholds. However, a data subject access request by Farage revealed that Coutts had, for months, been compiling evidence about the public relations risks of being connected to Farage, including his status as a politically exposed person (PEP) under AML/CFT legislation,^[7] in breach of its data protection obligations.^[8] The ensuing scandal led to the resignations of the chief executives of both the NatWest Group and Coutts.

Timeline of events March 2010 Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act is signed into US law. July 2014 The Common Reporting Standard (CRS) is approved by the OECD Council. October 2016 The French Constitutional Court strikes down the French public register of trusts in Re Helen S. April 2016 The UK establishes a Persons with Significant Control register. June 2017 The Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive enters into force. January 2018 Unexplained wealth orders come into force in the UK. May 2018 EU Directive 2011/16/EU (DAC6) implemented. January 2020 The Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive enters into force. February 2021 Report from UN High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity released. August 2022 OECD releases Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and amendments to the CRS; the UK Register of Overseas Entities comes into force. November 2022 Court of Justice of the EU holds that beneficial ownership registers of companies that are accessible to the public at large are invalid. July 2023 The German Ministry of Finance announces the Growth Opportunities Act; the UK House of Lords returns the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill with amendments; 138 members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting agree to outcome statement. January 2024 The US Corporate Transparency Act enters into force; European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament reach agreement on terms of the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive.

 

CJEU judgment

In one of the most significant recent decisions on this topic, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) held that BO registers of companies that are accessible to the public at large are invalid. The CJEU found this on the basis that public access infringes fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data. The judgment followed a number of appeals in Luxembourg relating to that country’s BO register, which provided public access to BO information regarding companies.

What might be next?

Governments are already experiencing positive economic results from the CRS and related measures. For example, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) experienced a 14 per cent rise in recoveries in 2018/19 as compared to 2017/18, due to the increase in resources and data. In 2019/20, before the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, HMRC estimated the yield from its tax compliance activities to be GBP36.9 billion.^[9] These results may encourage governments to push further into the realm of transparency.

The fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to new and increased taxes, given the huge fiscal stimulus that has been pumped into economies around the world to mitigate the economic disruption, and potentially new measures to collect and analyse taxpayers’ information to enforce such taxes, as discussed below.

Such measures may involve the following.

Increased enforcement activity

Until recently, revenue authorities in some countries have taken a restrained approach to enforcing compliance with FATCA and the CRS, but audit and enforcement activity is increasing. For example:

• The Cayman Islands legislature recently vested the Cayman Islands Tax Information Authority with comprehensive FATCA and CRS audit powers for ‘monitoring compliance’ with the Cayman Islands FATCA and CRS laws. These provisions authorise ‘examining, by way of scrutiny of returns, on-site inspections or audit reports, or in such other manner as the [tax authority] may determine, the affairs or business of any person’.
• Switzerland has also imposed statutory CRS audits. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration audits team requests and reviews written documents related to the CRS compliance of Swiss FIs, such as policies and procedures, training materials, IT updates and form templates.
• There is also evidence of Inland Revenue (the tax authority) in New Zealand increasing its enforcement activity in this area. Indeed, the authors are aware of situations where trustees in New Zealand have been requested by the tax authority to provide evidence of compliance in relation to trusts under their administration.

Closing the tax gap

In May 2022, HMRC embarrassingly conceded that it had no accurate estimate of the ‘offshore tax gap’, being the scale of taxes unpaid by UK tax residents in relation to their offshore interests.^[10] The significant embarrassment caused by this concession, and the subsequent political pressure, sparked a major push by HMRC to ascertain a more accurate estimate. Through analysing information gathered by the CRS, the Pandora Papers and the Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (J5), HMRC is now aware that about GBP570 billion is held in offshore tax havens by UK residents.^[11] This new knowledge has enabled HMRC to commence enforcement action in respect of tax irregularities, seemingly targeting taxpayers who reside in wealthy areas first.

Naming and shaming

In June 2012, British comedian Jimmy Carr was the subject of an investigation by The Times for his involvement in a tax avoidance scheme. The then-Prime Minister David Cameron commented as follows:

‘People work hard and pay their taxes; they save up to go to one of his shows. They buy tickets. He is taking the money from those tickets and he is putting that money into some very dodgy tax avoidance schemes.’

This led to Carr pulling out of the scheme (which was not illegal) and apologising for ‘a terrible error of judgement’. Rather than leave the matter for the tax authorities or even engage parliament to pass laws to prevent such activities, Cameron saw fit to comment on the morality of the steps taken by Carr.

Wealth inequality is a major social issue of our time and families and businesses are increasingly protective of their reputations and wary of being vilified by the press. If not challenged, this may become a tactic used in the future not only by journalists and politicians but also by revenue authorities.

Unexplained wealth orders

Unexplained wealth orders (UWOs) are a recent measure to combat tax evasion and money laundering. The orders allow law enforcement agencies to ask taxpayers with assets valued over a certain threshold to provide evidence of how they can afford these assets if their income seems insufficient. UWOs have already been implemented in several jurisdictions:

• In 2018, the UK introduced UWOs with a threshold of GBP50,000. Several UWOs have already been ordered in the UK against both PEPs and suspects involved in organised crime.
• As of August 2023, a Bill is currently being developed between the Indonesian government and legislative assembly that will, among other things, provide for a form of UWOs.^[12] The Bill comes as a reaction to several high-profile cases involving Indonesian state officials living an unusually luxurious lifestyle in comparison to their declared income. For an order to be made, the value of the relevant asset must exceed IDR100 million.

MDRs

Many jurisdictions have introduced MDRs for foreign or offshore tax structures. This measure has been introduced to address CRS non-compliance, tax avoidance and opaque offshore structures. In 2018, the OECD released a document containing public comments on the proposed MDRs for the CRS. The majority of responses raised concern with the wide ambit of the proposed MDRs, as they were proposed to apply to tax structures without regard to whether they were standard or inoffensive arrangements. The OECD proposal also raises retrospectivity issues, as it will require information about activities back to July 2014.

In July 2023, the German Ministry of Finance announced a draft Bill, the Growth Opportunities Act, which, if passed, would represent the most significant corporate tax reform in Germany since 2008.^[13] Importantly, the Bill proposes a reporting obligation for domestic tax arrangements, which would replicate the already-in-force MDR regime for international tax arrangements.

Global asset registry

In March 2019, the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT) released a paper proposing the implementation of a global asset registry (GAR). The ICRICT has not provided specific details on how the GAR would look in practice but has indicated that it would essentially take the form of a global BO register with information relating to a wide range of areas, including companies, securities, land and trusts.

Further work on BO registers

The EU, the UK and the US have made significant progress on the introduction of BO registers.

The UK

The UK is a world leader when it comes to BO transparency. In 2016, the UK established the Persons with Significant Control (PSC) register, requiring UK companies and other entities to register and report on their (direct and indirect) ownership.^[14] In 2022, the Register of Overseas Entities (ROE) was introduced in the UK, conferring the same obligations on UK companies and other entities captured by the PSC register to overseas entities who own UK property.

The House of Lords has recently amended the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which aims to reform the PSC register and ROE in the interests of even greater transparency. It will require property-owning overseas entities to notify the ROE of any changes in ownership within 14 days (rather than the previous limit of once a year) and the names of parties to trusts that own overseas entities in the ROE.

The EU

As noted above, under 5AMLD, BO registers were required to be established and were accessible to those demonstrating a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information in respect of trusts and, until the CJEU judgment, to the public at large in respect of companies. In January 2024, the European Council of Ministers and the European Parliament reached agreement on the terms of the EU Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD)^[15] and the regulations that will be issued under it. 6AMLD was first announced in 2021 as part of a package of reforms to improve the EU’s AML regime. Under 6AMLD, certain supervisory and public authorities, ‘obliged entities’ (being entities that are regulated under AML legislation) and those with a ‘legitimate interest’ in the information (including the media) will be able to access the BO registers. Unsurprisingly, given the CJEU judgment, it seems that public access to BO registers will not be included in 6AMLD.

The US

The recent enactment of the US Corporate Transparency Act (the CTA) also represents a major step towards a new global standard on BO transparency. The CTA applies broadly, capturing FIs, service providers, private clients and family offices.^[16] The CTA distinguishes between company applicants, being the persons involved in the formation of the entity, and beneficial owners, being the persons who hold a high degree of control over a company’s activities or have more than 25 per cent ownership. Under the CTA, companies must disclose exhaustive information, including but not limited to full names, business and residential addresses and Internal Revenue Service identification numbers.

Extension of FATCA/CRS to other asset classes

FATCA and the CRS only apply in respect of ‘financial assets’, which, broadly, include assets such as shares, partnership interests, commodities and swaps. However, it is likely that they will be extended to other asset classes:

• In August 2022, the OECD released its Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and made amendments to the CRS to bring cryptocurrency within its scope.^[17] The OECD is working on a timeframe for implementation of the changes.
• The OECD has announced a proposal to extend the CRS to real estate. This comes as a result of growing concern about the role that real estate transactions may play in tax evasion and money laundering.^[18]

The UN FACTI Panel

A February 2021 report from the UN High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity (the FACTI Panel) provides some insights into future developments in this area. The report is significant as it includes recommendations that could eventually lead to harmonised global tax rates, public registers of BO, unitary taxation and a global tax authority.

Inclusive Framework on BEPS

Following the FACTI Panel report, on 1 July 2021 it was announced that a number of jurisdictions had joined an OECD statement setting out ‘a two-pillar solution to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy’. This proposed solution included:

• reallocating some taxing rights in relation to certain multinational enterprises from home countries to countries where they actually operate; and
• implementing a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15 per cent.

Further member jurisdictions joined the statement after the announcement, with 143 having joined as of 9 June 2023. The OECD intends to implement the technical work done on the proposals in 2023.

In July 2023, 138 members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) agreed to an outcome statement,^[19] representing a major step towards reform of the international tax system. The outcome statement aims to implement the remaining aspects of the ‘two-pillar solution’ first raised in 2021.

A global standard on company ownership

Previously a niche concept, in recent years, BO transparency has advanced to the top of the global anti-corruption and AML/CFT agenda. However, despite significant progress, not all key financial centres have taken the steps to tackle BO secrecy. Transparency International’s analysis of the issue, first released in 2019, suggests that there are significant weaknesses in terms of ensuring BO transparency across the global network of FATF countries. Transparency International has called on the FATF to impose the following five key requirements on its member countries to ensure that the new global standard on BO transparency is effective:

• make BO registers a requirement;
• clearly define ‘beneficial ownership’;
• require independent verification of BO;
• close loopholes that allow anonymity in relation to bearer shares and nominees; and
• increase ownership transparency of foreign companies.

The recent introduction of BO registers by the UK and the US may increase pressure on other jurisdictions to adopt BO registers and on the FATF and other global organisations to set global standards for the same.

Tax authorities trawling transaction flows

Tax authorities have long had access to information from bank accounts, pension savings and foreign tax offices. However, it is lesser known that they also access data from credit card transactions, travel records, passports and the driving licence authority. Some experts say they also monitor social media and loyalty programmes.

With the growing power of digital communications and computing, together with new regulatory powers, tax authorities can now mine financial data deeper and faster than ever before. The COVID-19 pandemic has hastened this trend as the volume of electronic (as opposed to cash) transactions has increased. For taxpayers, this could make dealing with tax authorities more efficient as tax reporting processes are made more automatic. However, it could also increase tax officials’ scrutiny into the lives of citizens.

Sanctions

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 led to the imposition of sanctions against Russia. Sanctions are generally used for political purposes and furthering political agendas, and involve increased transparency in relation to the affairs of sanctioned individuals and entities. Many countries have passed sanctions legislation preventing certain interactions with specified Russian individuals and entities, in order to bring economic pressure on the Russian government to end the war.

Sanctions impose information-gathering obligations on, and restrict the business and other interactions of, private individuals and entities. Generally, businesses need to adopt a process for the screening of sanctioned individuals into their AML/CFT procures, or risk significant penalties if they (inadvertently or otherwise) breach sanctions. Sanctions are a common tool used by governments to influence the behaviour of foreign governments and individuals.

Japan and the US have also recently imposed sanctions on individuals and organisations associated with Hamas in response to the recent escalation of the Gaza crisis.

Conclusion

It is likely that governments will continue their efforts to maximise tax revenues to repay debt incurred as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. To do this, they will rely on both existing and, potentially, new information disclosure regimes to ensure that all tax payable is paid. It is unlikely that we are yet at the peak of transparency, at least in relation to tax matters.

However, we are arguably reaching a point at which requirements to disclose additional information could be unduly onerous and potentially counterproductive. Only a small proportion of the population is guilty of the crimes that current disclosure regimes seek to uncover, yet we are all subject to them.

Further, this is not to say that preventing these crimes does not justify the imposition of information disclosure regimes. However, it is important that transparency is balanced against the right to privacy. The importance placed on privacy can be seen both in recent privacy protection measures, such as the GDPR, as well as general public concern about privacy.

Certain geopolitical events are likely to continue to be relevant to the tension between privacy and transparency. Sanctions imposed on countries such as Russia involve the collection of private information in order to exclude certain individuals and entities from the global economy for political purposes. The goal with tools such as sanctions is not to collect tax or other revenue but instead to impose political pressure. Consequently, the cost involved is unlikely to ever be considered to outweigh the desired outcome.

The global trend is clearly heading towards more transparency and less privacy. Not only are transparency requirements here to stay, but they are set to strengthen, broaden and deepen as data gathering and sharing becomes more sophisticated and immediate than ever before. Affected individuals and entities have no choice but to comply. Further, the default setting is becoming automatic disclosure rather than ‘on request’ and authorities are investing in technology to enhance data gathering, reporting and exchange to enable international collaboration in relation to enforcement. Whether these measures are justified is almost a moot point, as governments face increasing pressure to collect tax, prevent crime and influence foreign governments.^[20]